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The legitimacy and effectiveness of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID)—a dispute resolution body established in 1966 under the
auspices of the World Bank—is a matter of spirited debate. It has been argued by some
that ICSID’s ideological and procedural bias impedes fairness and by others that its
complexity and cost restrict access to justice; many contend that the absence of an
appeal process has exacerbated uncertainty and unpredictability. In 2009, in the wake
of rampant dissatisfaction and ideological challenge, especially on the part of Latin
American states, Ecuador proposed the creation of a regional arbitration centre, as a
new component of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). This article
consolidates the myriad of criticisms launched against ICSID and qualitatively
assesses the relative likelihood and desirability of the UNASUR Arbitration Centre as
a successful alternative to ICSID and addition to the arbitration system. As analyzed
in this article, a combination of comprehensive reform efforts to ICSID can address a
majority of the issues at hand. However, as situated in a unique geopolitical context,
the UNASUR Arbitration Centre will continue to gain momentum, resulting in a hybrid
regime for international investment law, at least in the short- to medium-term. This
hybrid regime will be functional, serve an important purpose for Latin American
countries, and advance the goals of investment liberalization as a valid agenda.
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The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is in a state of
crisis. Although it has grown in membership and activity,1 and is gaining prominence in a global
economic environment embracing escalating levels of foreign investment, the ICSID has seen its
third membership withdrawal since 20072 and is under virtually non-stop attack.3 Latin America
has been a special pressure point. In recent years, the burden of the dramatic rise in the number
of ICSID arbitration requests has fallen most heavily on South American countries, which have
become respondents of claims from the United States (US) to Europe and beyond. Today, out of
187 cases pending, over seventy-five involve states from the Latin American region.4 More than
one-quarter involve a meager two countries—Argentina and Venezuela—while less than onetwelfth involve major developed countries.5
1 As

of 31 December 2014, 159 states have signed on to the ICSID Convention, 150 of which have deposited
instruments of ratification or acceptance. As of 31 December 2014, there are more than 2,700 bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) in existence, and ICSID has registered 390 investment dispute cases. See International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, “ICSID Fact Sheet,” online: <https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/
about/Documents/ICSID%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf>.
2 After

a barrage of anti-ICSID commentary from President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela gave notice of its withdrawal
in January 2012. See Luis Britto Garcia, “We Have to Get Out of the ICSID” (24 January 2012), online:
Venezuelanalysis <http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6766>. Bolivia and Ecuador gave notice in May 2007 and
July 2009, respectively.
3

See e.g. Michael Wilson, “The Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision: Moving a Bishop Vertically in the
Precarious ICSID System” (2012) 43:2 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 347 (cautioning that while Enron added a
“talismanic piece to the ICSID puzzle,” it leaves the proper scope of annulment review ambiguous and expansive);
Julien Fouret, “The World Bank and ICSID: Family or Incestuous Ties?” (2007) 4:1 Int’l Org L Rev 121 (clarifying
the possible conflicts of interest between ICSID and the World Bank and identifying associated structural and
philosophical problems); Susan D Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions” (2005) 73:4 Fordham L Rev 1521 [Franck, “The
Legitimacy Crisis”] (describing three sets of inconsistent decisions that have caused uncertainty and
unpredictability). See also Emmanuel Gaillard, “The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention” (2007) 237:122 NYLJ
3. But see Sergio Puig, “Emergence and Dynamism in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration
& International Investment Law” (2013) 44:2 Geo J Int’l L 531 (admitting that ICSID has “serious challenges” that
merit action, but providing evidence contradicting claims of the ICSID’s “unprecedented crisis” and explaining that
much can be learned from corrective measures previously taken elsewhere); Charles N Brower & Stephan W Schill,
“Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?” (2009) 9:2 Chi J Int’l L 471
(conceding that unpredictability and incoherence are issues in need of “serious attention,” but arguing that a solution
will come “with the passage of time”).
4

See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, “List of Pending Cases,” online: <https://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending>.
5

Ibid.
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In the wake of denunciation and defence, upheaval and entrenchment, the questions on
ICSID’s horizon are as numerous as they are varied. Is the ICSID structurally, procedurally,
functionally, or ideologically deficient? Can these deficiencies be justified? Why have major
destinations for foreign investment, such as Brazil, never acceded to the ICSID Convention?
Should domestic courts be preferred over international forums? Would a Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR) Arbitration Centre jeopardize ICSID’s future superiority in the
increasingly chaotic investment dispute settlement discussion?
This article will focus on these issues, primarily within the Latin American context. It
proceeds in four parts. Part I consolidates the criticisms levelled against the ICSID over the past
decade. Part II explains existing suggestions for reform, including the introduction of an
appellate body and the option of domestic courts. It argues that while delivery on these efforts
would constitute partial reclamation, it would likely be insufficient to suppress process
transformation over the long term. Part III shifts the focus to Latin American countries,
chronicling their adverse reactions to ICSID and the way these reactions have manifested
themselves.
Finally, Part IV outlines the major tenets of Ecuador’s proposal for an Arbitration Centre
under the rubric of UNASUR, analyzes its strengths and obstacles, and describes the larger
geopolitical context surrounding Latin America’s relationship with ICSID. It ultimately contends
that despite UNASUR’s promise, the Centre’s inherent weaknesses and these geopolitical factors
are likely to result in a hybrid regime for international investment arbitration. This hybrid system
will better serve the interests of both developed and developing countries by allowing for a
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regional dispute resolution forum for some disputes while broadly advancing the goals of
investment liberalization as a valid agenda.

!
I. CHALLENGES TO THE ICSID: IMBALANCE AND INCONSISTENCY
On 18 March 1965, the Washington Convention established the International Centre for
Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID),6 an autonomous international institution whose
primary purpose was to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international
investment disputes. Entering into force on 14 October 1966, the ICSID Convention sought to
remove impediments to the free international flows of private investment posed by noncommercial risks and the absence of specialized international methods for investment dispute
settlement.7
In the 1970s, there was no forum that functioned effectively and offered suitable means
of settling investment disputes directly between a private party and a government. The perceived
importance and usefulness of the institutional arbitration procedures of the ICSID were
immediately compared against the existing gap in international law.8 That said, given its

6

For general information on the ICSID and investment treaties, see generally Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer,
International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) at
363-451 (discussing the mechanics of ICSID arbitration proceedings); Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer,
Principles of International Investment Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 28-43; Christoph H
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) (providing a
thorough description of the history, financing, jurisdiction, and implementation of the Centre).
7

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, “About ICSID,” online: <https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=AboutICSID_Home>.
8

See Amazu A Asouzu, “A Review and Critique of Arbitral Awards on Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID
Convention” (2002) 3:3 J World Investment 397 (describing ICSID as a “cardinal achievement of the World Bank in
the development and advancement of international law). ICSID’s purpose was partly to halt the practice of “gunboat
diplomacy.” See Charles Vuylsteke, “Foreign Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitration” (1974) 4:2 Ga J Int’l &
Comp Law 343 at 343-344.
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institutionalization of investor-state arbitration,9 the ICSID was a novel type of institution at the
time—a concept unheard of until that point.10 The reason that states were willing to concede
control was to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).11 ICSID was seen to have a dual function:
dispute resolution, in the narrower context of international investment law; and legal
interpretation and clarification of other aspects of international law.12
Today, 88 per cent of ICSID’s caseload consists of Convention arbitration cases; the
remainder is comprised of additional facility arbitration cases and conciliation cases. While
international commercial arbitration focuses on dispute settlement between private parties and
interstate arbitration involves only states, ICSID arbitration oscillates between the two,13 with its
jurisdiction extending to legal disputes between member countries and individual investors.
As a witting or unwitting party to a world order dominated by institutions and processes
directed towards wealth enhancement, rather than wealth distribution,14 the ICSID has been a
target of attack from various fronts since its inception. As a result, developing countries and
scholars began to look at ICSID more critically, formulating an extensive laundry list of

9

By drafting agreements with investor-state arbitration clauses, signatory nations sought to depoliticize investment
disputes and empower foreign investors to reduce the risk of investment. See Eric Gillman, “The End of InvestorState Arbitration in Ecuador? An Analysis of Article 422 of the Constitution of 2008” (2008) 19:2 Am Rev Int’l Arb
269 at 271.
10

See Ibironke T Odumosu, “The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World” (2007)
8:2 San Diego Int’l LJ 345 at 356.
11

Notably, Brazil, the most successful country in Latin America at achieving this goal, is not a signatory to the
ICSID Convention, and it has refused all BITs. Brazil ratified the UNASUR treaty, discussed below, in July 2011.
12

Susan L Karamanian, “Overstating the Americanization of International Arbitration: Lessons from ICSID” (2003)
19:1 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 5 at 9.
13

Gautami S Tondapu, “International Institutions and Dispute Settlement: The Case of ICSID” (2010) 22:1 Bond L
Rev 81 at 81-82.
14

See generally Davidson Budhoo, “IMF/World Bank Wreak Havoc on the Third World” in Kevin Danaher, ed, 50
Years is Enough: The Case Against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Brooklyn, NY: South End
Press, 1994) 20.
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complaints. These include lack of financial and management structure and corresponding
inability to face its burgeoning workload;15 cracks in its system of voluntary enforcement and
award compliance;16 and inattention or lack of adequate attention to non-commercial interests
such as health or environmental protection.17 This article will consider four of the major
criticisms in turn.
A. Ideological and Procedural Bias
The first major underlying criticism has been the assumption of Western bias.18 Typifying
this criticism is the ICSID’s “umbilical cord” with the World Bank. The ICSID is part of the
World Bank Group: in addition to overlapping membership, the Bank funds the ICSID
Secretariat; the Governor of the Bank is an ex officio member of the ICSID’s governing body, the
Administrative Council; and the chair of the Council is the President of the Bank.19 Thus, Latin
American states have expressed adamant concern that hostility towards ICSID may hamper

15

See e.g. David Zaring, “Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law” (2008) 46:3 Colum J Transnat’l L
563 (recommending ways to increase the formality and capacity of international institutions of rulemaking while
maintaining sufficient flexibility).
16

See e.g. Olivia Chung, “The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on the Future of
Investor-State Arbitration” (2007) 47:4 Va J Int’l L 953 at 969-975 (explaining the tendency of states such as
Indonesia and Pakistan to escape the regime by defying arbitration); Andrew P Tuck, “Investor-State Arbitration
Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules” (2007) 13:4 L & Bus Rev Am 885 at 905-910 (describing the threat of non-enforcement in Latin America
and criticizing ICSID’s automatic enforcement mechanism as inadequate due to its problematic reliance on national
courts). But see David R Sedlak, “ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration” (2004) 23:1 Penn St
Int’l L Rev 147 at 161-170 (arguing in favour of waiver clauses and other protections measures to alleviate the
perceived weaknesses of ICSID award finality).
17

See e.g. Odumosu, supra note 10.

18

For a parallel discussion of Western bias as it relates to the International Court of Justice, see generally Eric A
Posner & Miguel FP de Figueiredo, “Is the International Court of Justice Biased?” (2005) 34:2 J Legal Stud 599.
19

Leon E Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege” (2012) 45:3 Cornell Int’l LJ 603 at 611-612 [Trakman, “The ICSID
Under Siege”].
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access to credit.20 While this “relationship of accountability” was partly the point of placing the
ICSID within the World Bank, it has the practical effect of making it difficult for developing
countries to protect their own investment interests at the expense of more significant powers,
especially as perceptions of disobedience or non-compliance are likely to have larger economic
implications for the developing country in question.
A related concern is that ICSID arbitration has done more to protect capital exporter
states and the “equitable” interests of their investors than to address the economic and social
interests of capital importing states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.21 The World Bank was
created to foster and buttress the economic development of developing states, yet one of its
counterparts, somewhat ironically, often seems to do the opposite. Most critics admit that the
ICSID does not have a responsibility to protect weaker parties outright, but do emphasize that
regardless of its “investment” orientation, the ICSID has not been sufficiently cognizant of its
position within the broader World Bank system, a system which at least theoretically demands
that the interests of developing countries be taken into account.
A third concern is a shadow of arbitration bias in favour of the investor.22 Article 14 of
the ICSID Convention states, “Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high
moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance,

20

Ibrahim FI Shihata, “The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: The Role of the World Bank,
With Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA” (1986) 1:1 Am U J Int’l L & Pol’y 97 (providing an early
discussion of the close relationship between ICSID and the World Bank).
21
22

Trakman, “The ICSID Under Siege,” supra note 19 at 606.

See e.g. Gus Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment
Treaty Arbitration” (2012) 50:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 211 (finding statistically significant evidence that arbitrators
favour the positions of claimaints over states, and the position of claimants from Western capital-exporting states
over claimants from other states).
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who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment.”23 While the composition of
arbitrator panels speaks directly to legitimacy,24 ICSID tribunals seem to weigh on the side of the
investor in a dominant proportion of investment arbitration cases. The process of disqualification
is shrouded in secrecy, hindering the development of objective standards.25 If the threshold is
whether the arbitrator demonstrates “actual or apparent partiality as well as if there is a risk or
potential of bias,”26 the proper approach must respond to the need even for the appearance of a
fair process, which arguably does not exist across ICSID arbitration settings.27 Ultimately, these
expressions of possible bias impair ICSID’s procedural fairness and contribute to developing
states’ reticence to its use as the premier forum for international investment arbitration disputes.
B. Absence of Appeals Process
The second main cluster of concerns relates to the absence of an ICSID appeals process.
Since the beginning, the ICSID has offered an internal annulment procedure available for
vexatious outcomes. However, ad hoc committees have shown an unfortunate tendency to go
halfway, with some taking a broad view of their powers or actively searching for additional
23

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, ICSID/15 (April 2006), article 14.1 [ICSID Convention].
24

Gabriel Bottini, “Should Arbitrators Live on Mars? Challenge of Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration” (2009)
32:2 Suffolk Transnat’l L Rev 341 (claiming that the independence and impartiality of arbitrators is the sine qua non
of the system’s legitimacy and stressing the need for more exacting standards).
25

See e.g. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua SA v
The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/17, Decision on a Second Proposal for the Disqualification of a
Member of the Arbitral Tribunal (12 May 2008) (setting out the four factors of proximity, intensity, dependence, and
materiality to be used in analyzing a bias challenge, and rejecting an arbitrator’s presence on the board of directors
as a serious conflict of interest). See also Urbaser SA et al v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/26,
Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Professor Campbell McLachlan, Arbitrator (12 August 2010) (finding
that opinions expressed in prior academic publications were not relevant enough to indicate a “manifest” lack of
independence or impartiality).
26
27

Schefer, supra note 6 at 477. One source of apparent bias can be the nationality of the arbitrator.

On the contrast, in the sister case AWG Group Limited v The Argentine Republic, which proceeded under the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the arbitrators concluded that disqualification was mandated where a reasonable and
informed person would have “justifiable doubts” as to the arbitrator’s independence and impartiality.
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grounds of annulment not relied upon by the applicant, blurring the line between annulment and
appeal and causing the risk that an ICSID award will be annulled to be greater than the risk that a
non-ICSID award will be set aside by a domestic court.28 The scrutinizing nature of ICSID
annulment proceedings may be viewed in a favourable light when compared, for example, to the
set aside proceedings under the 1958 New York Convention. However, annulment proceedings
alone are seen as incapable of responding to the wide array of investment disputes, their distinct
factual scenarios, and the eventual tribunal decisions. As such, many have criticized the
annulment procedure as insufficient,29 and several academics suggest the need for introduction of
an ICSID appellate body.30
Even when arbitrators have made errors in law, the lack of an ICSID appellate body has
created unpredictable standards and inconsistent decisions due to the lack of precedent or any
possibility of stare decisis.31 Verdicts range across the proverbial spectrum; different ad hoc

28

See Christoph Schreuer, “From ICSID Annulment to Appeal Half Way Down the Slippery Slope” (2011) 10:2
Law & Prac Int’l Cts & Tribunals 211.
29

See Dohyun Kim, “The Annulment Committee’s Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration: The
Need to Move Away from an Annulment-Based System” (2011) 86:1 NYU L Rev 242; Christopher Smith, “The
Appeal of ICSID Awards: How the AMINZ Appellate Mechanism Can Guide Reform of ICSID Procedure” (2013)
41:2 Ga J Int’l & Comp L 567. Smith expounds further, at 568:
In the process of seeking rapid finality, developments specific to international investment arbitration
have created two primary problems…. The first problem is the almost universal lack of a genuine
appellate process that would allow parties to appeal awards resulting from the faulty legal reasoning
of tribunals. Consequently, errant legal rulings made by arbitrators are not subject to any meaningful
form of judicial review. Second, the lack of clear precedent creates additional uncertainty.
30

See e.g. William H Knull, III & Noah D Rubins, “Betting the Farm on International Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer
an Appeal Option?” (2000) 11:4 Am Rev Int’l Arb 531. But see Irene M Ten Cate, “International Arbitration and the
Ends of Appellate Review” (2012) 44:4 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 1109 (clarifying that the case for appellate review in
investment arbitration only targets the lawmaking function, not error correction); Katharina Diel-Gligor,
“Competing Regimes in International Investment Arbitration: Choice between the ICSID and Alternative Arbitral
Systems” (2011) 22:4 Am Rev Int’l Arb 677 (asserting that ICSID’s lack of appeal process is a strength due to the
narrowness of remedies and assumed finality).
31

See e.g. Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis,” supra note 3.
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tribunals analyze factually similar cases and reach radically disparate results.32 For example, in
CMS v Argentina33 and LG&E v Argentina,34 the two tribunals reached virtually identical
conclusions on the substantive treatment standards, but came to diametrically opposed results on
the question of whether Argentina had been in a state of necessity during the relevant time
period.35
C. Lack of Transparency
In law, transparency includes making information and procedures accessible to other
parties and the public, holding decision-makers accountable for their decisions, and providing
avenues for criticisms or complaints to be heard and redressed. In the area of investment, the
transparency discussions can focus on either internal or external transparency. Internal
transparency aims to improve the investors’ and hosts’ access to relevant information and to
increase the foreseeability of the expected standards of behaviour through administrative
efficiency and reciprocal policy awareness.
External transparency refers to the openness of the investment system to those outside it.
This is where a majority of the criticism of ICSID has fallen. Efforts are underway to increase
transparency by arbitration panels as well as by the public’s access to documents—through the

32

See Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, “The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to Replace ICSID
Arbitration” (2011) 2:1 Beijing L Rev 134.
33

See CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (25 September 2007), at paras 149-150.
34

See LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (3 October 2006), at para 267.
35

For a detailed analysis of this divergence in the context of necessity, see Michael Waibel, “Two Worlds of
Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E” (2007) 20:3 Leiden J Int’l L 637. See also Harout Samra, “Five
Years Later: The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration
Boom” (2007) 38:3 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 667 at 693 (describing the tribunal’s award as “an effort to prolong
the final resolution”).
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registration of disputes, public hearings, the publication of party submissions, and the availability
of awards—but it is simply not moving fast enough.36 Third party participation remains a topic
of controversy.37 Consequently, more work must be done to explore implementation, as well as
the means of mitigating the disadvantages of transparency, such as the impact on confidentiality,
the compromise of procedural integrity, and the rise of potential conflicts of interest.38 Experts
should also investigate effective methods of assessing transparency in the investment arbitration
context.
D. Complexity and Cost
The fourth functional challenge to ICSID arbitration is the most straightforward: the
sheer cost and complexity. In the last decade, the financial crisis in Argentina and several
nationalizations carried out by young leftist governments in South America have spawned a
burgeoning number of claims before ICSID, and some nations have been unable to cope.39

36

See e.g. Daniel Barstow Magraw Jr. & Niranjali Manel Amerasinghe, “Transparency and Public Participation in
Investor-State Arbitration” (2009) 15:2 ISLA J Int’l & Comp L 337; Mabel I Egonu, “Investor-State Arbitration
Under ICSID: A Case for Presumption Against Confidentiality” (2007) 24:5 J Int’l Arb 479.
37

See Eugenia Levine, “Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in
Third-Party Participation” (2011) 29:1 Berkeley J Int’l L 200 (tracing the rationale for third-party participation in
dispute settlement as a means of increasing legitimacy and accountability); Barnali Choudhury, “Recapturing Public
Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic
Deficit?” (2008) 41:3 Vand J Transnat’l L 775 (positing that the efficacy of investment arbitration decisions on
public interest issues is limited by the lack of public participation); J Anthony VanDuzer, “Enhancing the Procedural
Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation” (2007) 52:4
McGill LJ 681 (arguing that tribunals’ realization of greater openness will diminish the potency of the accountability
critique).
38

See Joshua DH Karton, “A Conflict of Interests: Seeking a Way Forward on Publication of International Arbitral
Awards” (2012) 28:3 Arb Int’l 447. Means of mitigation may include joint third party submissions, tighter schedules
for timely disclosure, page and subject matter limits on amicus briefs, and exceptions for state secrets. See Magraw
& Amerasinghe, supra note 36 at 356-59.
39

For in-depth discussions of the Argentinian crisis and its interaction with ICSID, see Eric David Kasenetz,
“Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: The Aftermath of Argentina’s State of Necessity and the Current
Fight in the ICSID” (2010) 41:3 Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 709; William W Burke-White, “The Argentine Financial
Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System” (2008) 3:1 Asian J WTO & Int’l Health
L & Pol’y 199; Charity L Goodman, “Unchartered Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in
Argentina” (2007) 28:2 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 449.
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ICSID proceedings are difficult to manage and prohibitively expensive, impairing access to
justice and exacerbating the economic struggles of respondent developing countries.40 It is said
that every case costs the state party four million dollars, and there are increasing pressures to
resort to assistance from extremely expensive foreign law firms.41 In addition, travel costs to
Washington, DC and London alone are sometimes insurmountable; when Shell filed charges
against Nicaragua, it had revenues 62 times the state’s GNP.42

!
II. REFORM OF THE ICSID: RESPONSES AND SOLUTIONS
Arbitration has numerous advantages over other alternative dispute resolution processes:
the ability to predetermine what national or international law will apply to govern the dispute, to
codify the scope of the arbitration agreement, and to agree how disputes will be adjudicated even
before they arise.43 One study found a success rate of 63 per cent for arbitration, compared to
less than 20 per cent for bilateral negotiation and mediation.44 Two of the main reasons for
international investment arbitration’s effectiveness despite the lack of traditional law
enforcement are members’ incentives to preserve the general legitimacy of international law and
to avoid international reputation costs, which can be very steep in some circumstances.
Nevertheless, successful arbitration typically requires a distinctive blend of perceived legitimacy,
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award enforcement, and a delicate balance of power between the parties.45 Arbitrators, investors,
and policy-makers are conscious of this fact.46
That said, the ICSID has not been oblivious to the challenges described above, and has
taken some steps to remediate.47 In April 2006, the ICSID implemented a number of reforms to
its Rules and Regulations,48 including the introduction of Rule 37, which provides that a tribunal
may admit, after consulting the direct parties, the brief of a non-disputing party, as long as it
addresses a matter within the scope of the dispute.49 The amendments were the product of “18
months’ consultation with ICSID contracting states, the business community, civil society,
arbitration experts and other arbitral institutions.”50
Two prominent scholars have been similarly inclined to encourage ICSID adjustment
rather than overhaul, recently voicing particularly strong support for ICSID reform instead of
replacement.51 Others have joined in the chorus of optimism.52 Some have even claimed to
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provide preliminary evidence that the criticism of perceived bias has been misattributed to
ICSID.53 Most, however, remain wary of ICSID’s progress, and have pushed for reform efforts or
for the consideration of alternatives, several of which will be described below.
A. Improvements—An Appellate Body
One major recommendation to bolster the ICSID’s effectiveness is the expansion or
alteration of its annulment procedure. For some, the change means the introduction of a full
appellate body capable of an adapted form of judicial review.54 Others would be content with the
annulment committees taking a more active role in their decision-making.55 In the end, an
appellate body would be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for greater ICSID effectiveness
in the future. Specifically, it would eliminate concerns about the absence of an appeals process
and would assist in building a system of precedent to increase certainty and predictability. An
appellate body would also have indirect benefits, such as a positive impact on transparency and
reduced perceptions of bias. One drawback would be a likely increase in complexity and cost.
While the conflict between confidentiality and transparency is another contentious aspect
of investor-state arbitration, most scholars and practitioners agree on the need for the
53
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continuation of ICSID’s recent transparency and accountability efforts, including greater access
to public hearings and document and award disclosure.56 Similarly, some push for an expansion
of the ICSID’s jurisdiction to include “any plausibly economic asset or activity.”57 To counteract
declines in legitimacy, Stephan Schill recommends an expansion of public law thinking within
the existing structure of investment treaty arbitration and a reconceptualization of international
investment treaty arbitration as a public law discipline that transcends territorial borders.58
B. Alternatives—The Domestic Courts Option
One alternative to the ICSID that has been put forward forcefully by some is the use of
domestic courts for investor-state disputes.59 It is presumed that, if investment arbitration
privileges foreign investors, it undermines the national interest; and if it detracts from the
national interest, local courts ought to replace it.60 Domestic courts are subject to established

56

See Amanda L Norris & Katina Z Metzidakis, “Public Protests, Private Contracts: Confidentiality in ICSID
Arbitration and the Cochabamba Water War” (2010) 15:1 Harv Negot L Rev 31. Another recommendation is
improving the constitution of ICSID panels through changes to arbitrator qualification. See Odumosu, supra note
10. But see Wick, supra note 40 at 283 (alleging that the alternative forums for investor-state arbitration are all less
transparent than ICSID).
57

See Julian Davis Mortenson, “The Meaning of ‘Investment’: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International
Investment Law” (2010) 51:1 Harv Int’l LJ 257 (urging a reversal of the trend to curtail the categories of investment
eligible for protection under the ICSID Convention).
58

For the entire discussion, which is an impressive display of theoretical innovation, see Stephan W Schill,
“Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New
Public Law Approach” (2011) 52:1 Va J Int’l L 57. See also Schefer, supra note 6 at 454-473 (questioning whether
the discretion of whether to allow an amicus curiae submission should rest with the parties).
59

See e.g. Thiago Braz Jardim Oliveira, “The Authority of Domestic Courts in Adjudicating International
Investment Disputes: Beyond the Distinction Between Treaty and Contract Claims” (2013) 4:1 J Int’l Disp
Settlement 175 (arguing that deference to international dispute settlement mechanisms is incompatible with dispute
settlement clauses contained in investment treaties and contractual agreements that foresee a role to be played by
domestic courts).
60 A third

option, whereby foreign investors who feel that their rights have been violated can seek diplomatic
intervention by their home states, is conceivable but less frequently mentioned.

!15
procedural and evidential constraints in deciding cases, and their decisions are subject to appeal.
Support for domestic courts over arbitrators is also grounded in economic efficiency.61
Australia has been one country to indicate adoption of this approach in the very recent
past: a trade policy statement released on 12 April 2011 enshrines Australia’s view that domestic
courts, not investment tribunals, are the appropriate bodies to resolve investment disputes
between domestic states and foreign investors.62 The effect of the policy shift is that the
Australian government may negotiate that investment disputes be heard by domestic courts,
rather than by international investment arbitration tribunals. However, while the most practical
alternative to investor-state arbitration is domestic litigation, domestic litigation is just as open to
criticism:
[P]oking metaphorical holes in ISA [investor-state arbitration] is offset by
debilitating holes in domestic courts attempting to resolve investor-state disputes
transparently, even-handedly and in particular, consistently and fairly. Indeed,
ISA provisions in BITs provide a greater level of uniformity, predictability and
security than resort to domestic courts.63
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In addition, the wholesale embrace of domestic courts has other repercussions. If
domestic courts have the final word on investor-state arbitration, domestic laws and interests are
likely to further dilute international investment law and practice. Investors are highly skeptical of
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some domestic legal systems.64 Domestic courts do not ordinarily share tribunals’ expertise in
international investment law,65 and even with access to appeals, the multitude of judicial
representation may exacerbate inconsistency and uncertainty on the global scale. Therefore,
while domestic courts undoubtedly have potential to sidestep the obstacles that the ICSID has
encountered, their success is unpredictable, especially in Latin America, and their implications
are undeniable and partially perverse, leading us to look for solutions elsewhere.
C. Trends—Mediation and ADR
Mediation, an underused tool in investor-state dispute resolution, may become a useful
alternative to international investment arbitration in the future.66 As discussed above, investment
dispute cases have increased in number, complexity, cost, and length. Today, the measures
challenged cover a broad range of policy areas, including tax, subsidies, and licenses, and diverse
sectors such as oil and gas, mining, tourism, public utilities, and communications, among others.
Mediation has several useful advantages over arbitration: lower costs, flexibility of format,
reduced time frames, ownership of the process and outcome by the disputing parties, and a space
for more creative agreements that incorporate non-legal and non-monetary interests.
Other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) receiving heightened attention
include investment dispute detection, prevention, and management systems; early alert systems;
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and application of the “ombudsman model” to investment dispute settlement.67 Despite the lack
of enforceability, the self-determining nature that is at the core of mediation and ADR may lead
to more sustainable and durable agreements. It remains unlikely that mediation will overtake
arbitration as the preferred method of addressing investor-state disputes in the near term, but the
evolving investment environment provides a setting for its use and an opportunity for parties to
consider taking advantage of the benefits. A first step would be to establish explicit provisions on
the use of non-arbitration ADR in investor-state dispute settlement agreements.

!
III. THE LATIN AMERICAN REACTION: SUSPICION AND WITHDRAWAL
Bearing the brunt of its shortcomings and significant condemnation for its tepid or
unsatisfactory measures of reform, ICSID’s reputation among the countries of the developing
world has been dwindling to the point of consequential discredit. This displeasure has led to
widespread maligning and denunciation, and in Latin America particularly, a number of signs
point to a backlash against the ICSID, including award non-compliance, creation of public
agencies, and withdrawal from the ICSID Convention. These adverse reactions are explored in
greater detail in the first three subsections below, the fourth of which situates the discussion in
the larger context and analyzes the varied Latin American response through the lens of regional
geopolitics.68
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A. Overt Disobedience—Non-Compliance with ICSID Awards
Article 54 of the ICSID Convention states, “Each Contracting State shall recognize an
award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations
imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that
State.”69 On the contrast, Argentina defends the “Rosatti doctrine,” an approach—named after
the former Argentinian Minister of Justice—which claims that the ICSID’s favouring of foreign
investors amounts to discrimination and violates the Argentine Constitution’s principle of
equality before the law.70 Therefore, Articles 27 and 75.22 of the Constitution are interpreted to
imply that BITs and the ICSID Convention are subordinate, and awards should be reviewable by
national courts. In Jose Cartellone v Hidroelectrica, the Argentine Supreme Court stressed that it
may review arbitral awards if it finds the awards “unconstitutional, unreasonable or illegal,” even
if the parties had waived their right to appeal.71
Similarly, Article 366 of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution states, “[A]ll foreign companies
operating in the oil and gas sector are subject to the sovereignty of the State and under no
circumstances will a foreign tribunal be recognized nor can international arbitration or
diplomatic interventions be resorted to”; and Article 422 of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution
prohibits the enactment of treaties or international instruments in which Ecuador cedes sovereign
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jurisdiction to international arbitration.72 In July 2010, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court
declared a number of ICSID-related BITs unconstitutional on this basis.
B. Institutional Resistance—National Courts and Public Agencies
Over the past three years, Venezuela has pursued a policy of “preventive soaking.” On 15
June 2009, its Supreme Court issued a press release, under the title “Venezuela’s immunity
against foreign courts is consolidating,” emphasizing its rejection of the classical configuration
of international investment arbitration.73 Venezuela may also resort to an “internal test” argument
borrowed from Argentina to effect non-compliance with any ICSID award rendered against it. As
a result, foreign investors may be confronted with a formidable “shield” between Venezuela and
ICSID, contributing to a further weakening of its legitimacy.
Another expression of Latin American institutional resistance is the creation of
specialized public agencies to protect themselves from ICSID arbitration. In April 2007,
Nicaragua created the Interinstitutional Commission for the Defense of the Nicaraguan State
against Investment Disputes.74 In June 2008, Bolivia created a new Ministry responsible for the
legal defence of the state against foreign investors.75 Translated, its motto reads, “the motherland
is not for sale, but to be defended.” While these agencies may be seen by some as a logical
response to investment treaties and, as such, an implicit endorsement of the role of ICSID
arbitration, they also indicate, at the very least, a skepticism and distrust of the ICSID regime by
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developing countries, and, when seen in the context of other actions taken, a pattern of
denunciation.
C. Systemic Rejection—BITs, Resource Nationalism,76 Convention Withdrawal
Some Latin American countries have shifted towards a policy of resource nationalism,
placing natural resources, especially oil, under the control of national companies. For example,
although Bolivia’s nationalization of the hydrocarbons sector in the last century was harshly
reviewed, the president approved the nationalization of mining and other sectors in 2006.77 In
Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez has followed a similar approach, signing cooperation and
integration agreements within Latin America and adopting a clause within its Terms and
Conditions for the Establishment and Operation of Mixed Enterprises which stressed that the
Venezuelan courts, not international arbitrators, are the competent venues for dispute
resolution.78 The looming question is whether, if oil prices decline, it will lead to a fading of
resource nationalism, or if broader regional approaches will have taken a firm and lasting hold.79
Latin American countries have also begun exploiting BITs in order to turn them against
ICSID or to effect its ostracization. These objectives have materialized in three ways: (1) the
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inclusion of options to choose between ICSID and ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL; (2) the
widespread termination of BITs; and (3) the drafting of new model BITs. The first has been
practiced by Paraguay, Colombia, and Peru, among others, in multiple BITs with China, Japan,
and European countries since 2005;80 the second, by Venezuela and Ecuador, with the former
terminating its BIT with the Netherlands in 2008, and the latter terminating BITs with ten
countries.81 Colombia’s 2007 BIT “Model” provides an illustration of the third: it establishes a
“fork-in-the-road” between national courts and international arbitration, and it does not include
an umbrella clause, precluding that a breach of contract between a state and foreign investor
becomes a breach of the BIT.82
The most dramatic form of denunciation that has demonstrated Latin America’s resolve to
flaunt the ICSID is withdrawal from the Convention.83 Any exit from the global forum signals
countries’ terminal loss of faith in the system and raises questions about ICSID’s fitness for
purpose.84 For a period of time, it appeared as if the statements made by Latin America—no
matter how vilifying—were empty threats. Suddenly, in May 2007, the World Bank received a
80
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written notice of denunciation of the ICSID Convention from Bolivia, and pursuant to Article 71
of the Convention, the denunciation took effect six months after receipt, in November 2007.85
Simultaneously, Ecuador sought to escape by relying on Article 25.4 of the Convention,
providing for the exclusion of “differences arising on matters concerning the treatment of an
investment, resulting from economic activities concerning the use of natural resources such as
oil, gas, minerals...” from ICSID’s jurisdiction.86 Almost two years later, Ecuador notified the
Bank of its withdrawal from the ICSID Convention. The withdrawal was decided by Ecuadorian
Executive Degree, and took effect on 7 January 2010. Finally, in January 2012, Venezuela gave
notice of its intent to withdraw from the Convention,87 comprising the third Latin American state
to file for divorce from the ICSID in barely five years.
D. Strategic Signalling—The Impact of Regional Geopolitics
States have multiple avenues—from bilateral negotiations to non-binding mediation to
military conflict—to reach settlements over disputed issues. They must forego other options
when choosing arbitration, whether under the ICSID or the aegis of a regional body such as
UNASUR. There are two primary reasons for developing countries to agree to bilateral
investment treaties involving international investment arbitration. The first is in pursuit of
economic self-interest: in addition to investment in-flows,88 BITs enable the host country to
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leverage the power of a resource group and to extract greater value from the investment without
traditional legal or contractual enforcement.89
Secondly, developing countries may use arbitration strategies as an opportunity to engage
in political messaging or to signal larger discontent, separate from the shortcomings of the
investment system itself.90 These non-economic, non-legal variables include strategic behaviour
and historical background.91 On some level, the Latin American reaction to ICSID represents an
ideological challenge to trade liberalism. This “engine of ideology” can be seen clearly when
examining the individual state response to the ICSID over the past five years.92 Bolivia and
Ecuador, the most radical of the ICSID-hostile countries, have led the charge towards ICSID
denunciation. Most notably, these two countries—along with Venezuela and its openlydisgruntled leaders—are the countries that have withdrawn from the Convention. As discussed
above, Bolivia and Ecuador have taken dramatic constitutional steps to distance themselves from
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international arbitration jurisdiction. Finally, Ecuador and Venezuela have terminated the highest
number of BITs compared to their Latin American counterparts.
On the contrast, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru, among others, have chosen to pursue
their interests from a position of compromise: by drafting new BITs or by pushing for greater
option flexibility within existing BITs. This simultaneous antagonism toward and embrace of the
international arbitration regime splits Latin America along ideological lines. It is critical that
policymakers recognize these realities and the impact of the underlying political thrust on the
long-term viability of any international arbitration system. These must therefore be kept in mind
when assessing the UNASUR Arbitration Centre as a regional alternative, a task to which this
article now turns.
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IV. THE PROMISE OF UNASUR: RECOGNITION AND RELIEF
Frustration with ICSID—or, in three instances, its abandonment—has left Latin America
in a state of transition when it comes to resolving international investment disputes. As dozens of
BITs still exist, ICSID plays a predominant role in the region, but the search for a permanent
alternative addressing Latin American complaints has become ever more urgent. Part IV focuses
on the most promising of the alternatives proposed, a regional arbitration centre within
UNASUR, analyzing its potential strengths and describing the weaknesses that it will be forced
to overcome to arrive at a place of serious legitimacy.
A. Overview of Ecuador’s Proposal
On 23 May 2008, the Constitutive Treaty of the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) was signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana,
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Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela; on 11 March 2011, the treaty entered into force.93 In
June 2009, at the 39th Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States
(OAS), Ecuador’s Foreign Minister proposed that UNASUR create an arbitration centre as an
alternative to ICSID. In December 2010, Ecuador submitted a proposal for the arbitration
centre’s dispute settlement system, and the Foreign Ministers of the UNASUR member countries
unanimously decided that Ecuador should chair the corresponding working group.
The Ecuadorian proposal contained three documents: (1) a set of rules for an Arbitration
Centre (the “Centre”); (2) a Code of Conduct for UNASUR arbitrators; and (3) a Counseling
Centre for settling investment disputes. The Arbitration Centre shall be composed of the Centre
Board (representatives of member states) and the General Director. The country holding the
Presidency Pro-Tempore of UNASUR shall fill the Chair of the Centre Board. The Operating
Rules allow settlement of dispute between states and between a state and investor by virtue of
any contractual provision or provision in an international instrument (Article 2).94
The jurisdiction of the Centre precludes disputes concerning health, education, taxation,
energy, and the environment, unless expressly stated otherwise in the relevant contract or treaty.
Under no circumstances will an arbitral tribunal have jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning
the internal laws of a UNASUR member state or to the economic effects of a general norm.
As a precondition for arbitration, the states can require the exhaustion of domestic
judicial and administrative remedies, and in circumstances where a claim arises in relation to a
state’s administrative actions, there will always be a duty to have exhausted local remedies
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(Article 3). The parties shall endeavour to resolve any dispute by consultations concluded within
6 months from the date of filing the request, unless the parties agree otherwise. The parties may
by mutual agreement proceed directly to the stage of mediation (Article 4).95
The mediation is closed (a) when the parties sign a settlement agreement; (b) by decision
of the mediator where it is deemed unlikely that the continuation of mediation will settle the
dispute; or (c) by written decision of any party at any time after attendance at the first meeting
(Article 5). The state of the investor can initiate a mediation process, but the parties may by
mutual agreement dispense with this process (Article 6). In the case of an investor-state dispute,
the investor shall notify the state before initiating the arbitration process.
The tribunal shall be composed of three arbitrators, unless the parties decide that another
odd number would be appropriate. Each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and both parties shall,
within 30 days and by mutual agreement, designate the tribunal’s president and substitute. If the
parties do not select an arbitrator, or if there is no agreement on the selection of the tribunal’s
president, the General Director of the Centre shall designate him or her by lot (Article 9).96
In line with the UNCITRAL97 and SCC98 Rules, Article 3 provides that an arbitrator must
disclose any “interest, relation or issue that may affect the independence or impartiality or that
might reasonably create an impression of dishonesty or unfair behavior in the process.” In this
context, independence is an objective test relating to the absence or existence of actual
95
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identifiable relationships with any party to the proceedings, whereas impartiality is a subjective
test examining the likelihood of an arbitrator’s state of mind favouring one side in the dispute
(Article 5). To support this objective, Article 6 states that former arbitrators cannot publicly
comment on cases similar to those that they previously decided.
Any party may challenge an arbitrator during the election, under any circumstances that
give rise to justifiable doubt about their impartiality, independence, and compliance with the
Code of Conduct. Within five days of the challenge, the disputing parties may agree to accept the
challenge, in which case the challenged arbitrator shall resign. If there is no agreement between
the parties, the General Director shall decide the recusal within five days (Article 10).
During the proceedings, when any party determines that an arbitrator should be replaced
for failing to meet the requirements of the Code of Conduct, that party must notify the other
party within 15 days from the date on which the party became cognizant of the violation. If the
arbitrator replaced is not the tribunal’s president, the parties can reach an agreement to replace
him or her, and shall elect a replacement pursuant to Article 9. If the parties fail to reach
agreement, they must request that the matter be raised to the president, whose decision is final. If
the president does not meet the requirements of the Code and there is no agreement between the
parties, either party may request that one member on the list of arbitrators, chosen by lot, decide
the matter. If this arbitrator decides against the president of the tribunal, the arbitrator shall
choose a new president by lot (Article 12).99
In order to avoid forum shopping, Article 19 establishes the exclusivity of the Arbitration
Centre. It states that when parties submit a dispute to the Centre, they renounce the use of
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another forum for disputes related to the same matter. In relation to the transparency of the
proceedings, all arbitrations, including the associated documents, records, evidence, hearings,
and awards, shall be completely public, except for those relating to defence and national security
or special cases determined by mutual consent of the parties (Articles 23 and 26).
Regarding amicus curiae, or third party intervention, the tribunal can receive unsolicited
letters from individuals or other legal entities established in the territory of the parties, unless the
parties agree otherwise. The letters must be concise in addressing issues relevant to the matter of
fact or law submitted for the tribunal’s consideration, and must be received within 10 days from
the date of the tribunal’s confirmation (Article 35).
In order to avoid inconsistent decisions and awards, the arbitral tribunal shall consolidate
two or more proceedings with common questions of fact or law (Article 22). The award shall be
decided within a period of 240 days from the date of the tribunal’s constitution, extendable up to
120 days with the mutual agreement of the parties (Article 41). The awards will be published and
have precedential value (Articles 21 and 26).
The awards rendered under a tribunal can be challenged by rectification, revision,
annulment, and appellation. An application for annulment is based on the following grounds: (1)
the tribunal was not properly constituted; (2) the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers; (3) a
tribunal member was corrupt; (4) there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or (5) the award did not state the reasons upon which it was based. The application of
annulment must be decided within 60 days of the constitution of the annulment tribunal.100
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Where an award is submitted for appellate review of questions of law, an appellate
tribunal will decide by consensus. Eight arbitrators would constitute the pool for the appellate
tribunal, which would then be comprised of three arbitrators for any given case. The appeal must
be decided within 60 days of the constitution of the appellate tribunal (Article 44).101
The enforcement regime envisaged by the Centre requires immediate compliance with an
award, or within a time frame agreed to by the parties, with exceptions for civil or economic
emergency. The only basis for denying recognition and enforcement of the award is when the
subject of the dispute is not arbitral or is contrary to public policy (Article 47). In the event that
the award is not honoured, the matter shall be returned to the original tribunal that heard the
dispute. In investor-state disputes where the state does not wholly comply with the award, the
home state may temporarily suspend concessions and obligations owed to the host state. Such
suspension must be proportional to the degree of non-compliance (Article 49).102
The Counseling Centre will provide legal guidance, technical assistance, research, and
specialized studies, as well as legal representation in investment disputes (Article 2). If a conflict
of interest arises, where the antagonistic parties are among countries part of UNASUR and the
Centre, the Centre is prohibited from providing its services (Article 3).
Both the Arbitration Centre and the Counseling Centre will begin with a three-year period
of UNASUR members-only use. During a second three-year stage, launching immediately
following the first stage, other Latin American countries will be invited to use the Centres. After
six years, the Centres will be open to all countries.
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B. Strengths and Benefits
Ecuador’s proposal addresses all four of the concerns raised in Part I of this article: (i)
ideological and procedural bias; (ii) absence of an appeals process; (iii) lack of transparency; and
(iv) complexity and cost. First, the nature of the disqualification process alleviates ideological
and procedural bias by closely mirroring the International Chamber of Commerce and SCC
Rules, and improves arbitrator regulation through the addition of selection by lot. In contrast
with the ICSID’s demand for disclosure of any conflicts of interest, UNASUR’s rules and
requirements of independent judgment raise the standard to the likelihood of prejudgment or that
which “might reasonably create an impression of dishonesty.” This approach does not remove
concerns with respect to arbitration’s lack of institutional safeguards of judicial independence
(especially security of tenure and financial security, in the form a set salary from the state), nor
address the lack of prohibitions of side work as a lawyer that may create conflicts of interest with
cases heard by an arbitrator.103 However, both UNASUR’s process and higher subjective
standard do assist in addressing the issue of bias raised earlier.
The establishment of an appeal mechanism and a system of precedent accrues further
benefits, and responds directly to the second weakness, namely the absence of an appeals
process. The resulting consistency and coherence of jurisprudence would create predictability
and enhance the legitimacy of the investment arbitration system. Thirdly, the rules on
transparency, providing exceptions only for national security and special cases, are consistent
with the NAFTA arbitration framework104 and would foster greater openness and democratic
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initiative. The enforcement limitations for non-arbitrable subjects or on grounds of public policy
mimic the New York Convention and most international arbitration rules apart from ICSID.
Fourthly, Latin American countries could take advantage of cost efficiencies associated
with the Centre as arbitration forum. For example, the Centre’s use would extinguish the
excessive expense of travelling to London or Washington, DC for any investment disputes settled
therein. Finally, the rollout implementation strategy and the integration of consultation and
mediation opportunities prior to arbitration are creatively useful approaches that appear to have
few downsides.105 The influence of the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement system
regarding the consultation stage, appellate proceedings, and award compliance, is constructive,106
and the common political will of UNASUR member countries to establish the Arbitration Centre
speaks to the depth of their commitment.
C. Potential Obstacles
Although UNASUR’s Arbitration Centre has many benefits that address ICSID’s four
major shortcomings, it nonetheless suffers from a number of certain and potential obstacles. One
immediate caveat is that it is unproven. The remainder can be divided into three categories: (1)
practical calibrations;107 (2) perceived insulation; and (3) overall lack of cohesion.
First, UNASUR’s Arbitration Centre will have to overcome some technical hurdles by
fine-tuning its proposed scheme and rules. For example, the requirement to exhaust domestic
remedies, whether administrative or judicial, could force the injured party to wait years until
applying to the UNASUR Centre. Undeniably, there are good reasons for the duty, including
105
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economic, legal, and precedential considerations, but UNASUR member countries must be
cautious to develop a clear and concrete framework that advises countries on their
responsibilities and settlement recourses at various points in a dispute. Although the Arbitration
Centre’s scope of action would be significantly enlarged compared to the ICSID, the
jurisdictional stipulations considerably reduce matters connected with commerce. It will be
impossible to eliminate forum shopping entirely, as the investor cannot prohibit its shareholders
from suing in another forum.
In addition, the rollout implementation model may result in a perception of regional
insulation. Some believe that the main flaw of UNASUR is in its attempt to supply an
ideological retort to US hegemony.108 Likewise, ICSID and UNCITRAL are universal, if
imbalanced, forums for international investment arbitration. If UNASUR’s Centre is viewed as a
mere regional consortium or as an improper venue by investors,109 it might be spurned wholesale
as a second-tier example of NAFTA with developing countries at the forefront. Admittedly,
global respect for Brazil as an economic powerhouse may suppress these impressions, but the
risks remain. Any such forum, whether regional or global, will also carry risks of political
interference, especially in the absence of the conventional elements of judicial independence.
A third potential obstacle is UNASUR’s lack of cohesion as a whole. The model to which
UNASUR compares itself is far from perfect: despite strong beginnings, the European Union
(EU) is showing present signs of difficulty to generate consensus and distribute benefits to its
108
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member countries, and prioritizing the expansion over the deepening of the union has resulted in
crisis. Similarly, a wide spectrum of economic policy differences exists among Latin American
countries: Colombia and Mexico favour free trade, while Venezuela and Bolivia are more leftwing.110 It is arguable that historic rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, or territorial disputes
between Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, will never truly disappear. Given the relative lack of resources
in Latin America, is it worthwhile to channel them towards bureaucracy? Finally, the political
mood on the continent is quite unruly, and new governments could radically change the
diplomatic configuration.
D. Recommendations
UNASUR’s proposed Arbitration Centre has adequate promise to remain a part of the
discussion on how to resolve international investment disputes. However, policymakers must
address the shortcomings highlighted above, especially promoting independence, fairness,
openness, and a proper balance between investor protection and regulatory flexibility. UNASUR
must work to ensure that investors see the Centre as a viable venue for arbitration. In addition,
there are several items that demand consideration.
First, ensuring the high academic and professional qualifications of the arbitrators, as
well as their independence and impartiality in practice, will be essential to the success and
longevity of the proposed Centre. It will be important to relax the limitations on the scope of
jurisdiction, and to state a reasonable limit of time for the requirement to exhaust domestic
judicial remedies, to protect certainty and predictability. The 10-day limit on amicus curiae is too
short; it should be extended until the submission of the allegations. There must also be some
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flexibility regarding exclusivity. The Centre should include a fee cap on the costs of arbitrators,
and a binding cooling-off period of three years post-service, during which arbitrators cannot
work as counsel or experts in investment cases.111
It is also recommended that the consultation stage be mandatory only for state-state
disputes, because in the case of investor-state disputes, parties do not have equal negotiating
leverage and would benefit from the intervention of a mediator or arbitrator. In relation to the
consolidation of similar proceedings, it is necessary to consider the NAFTA Rules to permit a
tribunal feasibility evaluation on a case-by-case basis. To strike an effective balance between
transparency and confidentiality, the parties should have a more versatile right to request
confidentiality of certain documents, such as those containing corporate secrets. Finally, the
Centre should be creative in its structure and available selection: submitting to arbitration rulings
over a series of smaller issues poses less of a risk to disputants than a comprehensive ruling, as it
provides the ability to back out at various stages.
Arbitration will be most effective when it reflects the political realities on the ground and
produces settlements that do the same. As a result, foreign investment participants worldwide
will be best served by a “hybrid” system that includes both ICSID and regional arbitration
forums such as the UNASUR Arbitration Centre. This hybrid system will preserve investment
liberalization, which is attractive for developed states, and preserve a regional alternative, which
is attractive for developing states.112 A similar desire for flexibility and the need to find
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agreement over complex, multidimensional issues supports the usefulness of a hybrid system,
which would allow for the UNASUR Centre to handle region-specific disputes or disputes
between accepting countries, and for the ICSID to remain in place when non-accepting countries
are involved. This hybrid regime also recognizes the complex political undercurrents in regions
such as Latin America, and provides a framework that is more robust as local and national
governments inevitably change over time.
One possible counter-argument is that such a hybrid system would create the perception
of a “two-tier” regime for international investment arbitration. However, this criticism can be
discounted on the following grounds. First, it need not be restricted to a developing/developed
state dichotomy. UNASUR should take steps to frame the Centre as a legitimate alternative for
all countries and to encourage global participation in its Centre and other regional alternatives if
and when they arise. Secondly, even if such a perception is somewhat inevitable, the flexibility,
comprehensiveness, and other benefits of a hybrid regime make the trade-off worthwhile.
Another potential counter-argument is that the rationales from both the perspective of
developed and developing states do not support a hybrid system. In other words, developed states
will want to enforce ICSID only, based on efficiency grounds, and developing states should be
coaxed to “get with the program” and embrace the ICSID system so as to gain greater access to
capital. However, if the Centre is viewed as a dispute resolution alternative of mutual benefit
under certain circumstances, developing states, including Latin American countries, should feel
empowered, not hindered, by espousing its use. Developed states might be more of a tough sell,
but they may also stick with the ICSID in the short term. Over time, as the Centre establishes
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itself and can be observed to fill a helpful niche within international investment law, developed
states will be motivated to agree to its use as an alternative arbitration forum.
In the end, the UNASUR Arbitration Centre can be an alternative forum for investment
dispute resolution, but it must offer a legitimate and profound alternative. ICSID is costly and
close-mouthed; the Centre must be at least marginally affordable. ICSID is beholden to those
with power; the Centre must accommodate those without. ICSID works with the present; the
Centre must operate in the future. ICSID is driven by commercial interests; the Centre must
grapple with the interests of justice and society. The Centre should seek to inspire a root-andbranch review of the patterns of international investment arbitration, and imbue developing
countries with the conviction to regain some of the clout that has been thereby forfeited.
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V. CONCLUSION
The system surrounding international investment law has undergone significant change
over the past decade. The number of arbitration cases has skyrocketed; ICSID has come under
increasing scrutiny; new strategies, such as mediation, are gaining ground; and non-ICSID
alternatives have been proposed and developed. The fracture is widening, and a Latin American
apparition lurking in the waters is steadily making its way towards land, upsetting the stability of
a lucrative industry built on illusions of neutrality. Brazil’s rise, coupled with the diminished
influence of the United States and the progressively salient global role of China, has reshuffled
the kaleidoscope of regional allegiances in the Americas. Emerging counterweights, competing
asymmetries, and shifting fault lines have had grave repercussions that threaten an economic
earthquake of mammoth proportions.
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Although its task is formidable, the UNASUR Arbitration Centre, with its singular
ambition and the chance to learn from “deficient” projects like Mercosur, has crucial prospects
for investors, states, and scholars alike. Michael Shifter explains:

!

It is tempting to be skeptical about the proliferation of these crosscutting and
often overlapping mechanisms…. It is hard to know whether they will be able to
sustain and strengthen their efforts, or will, with time, simply fade into the
background. Even so, it would be a mistake to ignore or dismiss the rich
institutional experimentation under way and the new regional architecture that is
taking shape.113

This article has taken steps not to “ignore or dismiss,” but to engage critically with one form of
Latin America’s “rich institutional experimentation.” The system of international investment
arbitration in Latin America and beyond is no longer on the “eve of a drastic change,”114 but it is
evolving quickly in the direction of a hybrid regime. Looking forward, it is expected that ICSID
will continue to retain a stronghold, although its mantle as the dominant forum for investment
arbitration may have been shaken.115
Latin America, in particular, will see a distinct fusion of arbitration methodologies. This
hybrid system, comprised of both ICSID arbitration and regional alternatives such as the
UNASUR Arbitration Centre, is both likely to emerge and desirable. It will be functional in
addressing the problems that continue to plague the ICSID. It will also satisfy international
investment participants. First, the hybrid system will advance the goals of investment
liberalization, which is desirable for developed states. More importantly for Latin America and
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other developing states, it will allow for regional cooperation and collaboration in the case of
some disputes, which will mean cost efficiencies, reduced perceptions of bias, and an overall
sense of ownership. In the final analysis, the UNASUR Centre may not be faultless in addressing
ICSID’s shortcomings and providing a sound alternative to classic international investment
arbitration, but with its unique contribution and the measured incentive of its member states, it
will remain with us for a period of considerable duration.
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